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Abstract 
 
Governments and policy-makers are increasingly faced with the trade-off of protecting their tax revenue bases while 
maintaining their international competitiveness. This is exemplified by the international trend of jurisdictions reducing their 
headline corporate tax rates, which is often justified on the basis that these cuts will lead to improved efficiency and integrity 
outcomes. This article explores whether it is more efficient to implement corporate tax cuts or an alternative reform such as an 
economic rent tax which may better achieve the tax policy goals of efficiency and integrity. 
 
In doing so, this article bridges the gap between applied legal research, economic theory and practical optimisation modelling. 
Specifically, this research presents a simulation analysis of the behavioural responses of a tax-minimising multinational 
enterprise to both existing and proposed tax regimes and compares efficiency and integrity outcomes upon implementing 
corporate tax cuts. This is complemented by a legal comparative analysis featuring case studies of an economic rent tax; namely, 
the Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) as introduced in Belgium and Italy. These case studies will focus on the political 
hurdles to implementing and sustaining these reforms, which will highlight key lessons learnt from the implementation of the 
ACE in practice.   
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1. BACKGROUND 
The advent of the global digital economy has heightened opportunities for aggressive 
tax planning by multinational enterprises (MNEs) and has spurred harmful tax 
competition between governments. Governments and policy-makers are increasingly 
faced with the trade-off of increased international competitiveness to encourage 
investment from MNEs with the need to protect their tax revenue bases.  
Recently, prominent members of the G20 have signalled their intention to eventually 
reduce their headline corporate tax rates; this is exemplified by the US and the UK, who 
are both now targeting reductions to their corporate income tax (CIT) rates; to possibly 
as low as 15 per cent.1   
There is a perception that cross-border anti-avoidance rules such as thin capitalisation 
and transfer pricing rules effectively protect the tax revenue base from aggressive tax 
planning behaviour in the cross-border intercompany context. However, the ability of 
these rules to restrict tax deductibility is often conflated with their ability to attain 
efficiency and integrity outcomes. Previous research by the author has demonstrated 
that these rules do not eliminate tax-induced distortions, which would be required to 
attain efficiency. On the other hand, economic rent taxation is generally considered in 
the economic literature to be an appropriate mechanism to eliminate tax-induced 
distortions. 
Given the tension commonly experienced by policy-makers between lowering the 
headline rate of CIT as opposed to implementing economic rent taxes, this article 
compares the efficiency and integrity outcomes between these two reform approaches. 
Academics and commentators such as De Mooij and Ederveen highlight the normative 
value in the argument for ‘a neutral tax treatment of incomes earned in different legal 
forms’.2 Previous research by the author has examined the conceptual case for why it 
might be appropriate and feasible to restrict the tax deductibility of cross-border 
intercompany interest, dividends, royalties and lease payments given their mobility and 
fungibility.3 As such, it is arguably preferable for MNEs to be subject to economic rent 
taxation, as is attained through reform proposals such as the allowance for corporate 
equity (ACE), in this context. 
Even though the cross-border issue cannot be isolated from the rest of the tax system,4 
the focus of this article is the cross-border dimension because distortions in tax laws are 
highly problematic in this context. For example, the phenomenon of thin capitalisation 
arises from the decisions of revenue authorities to create a tax-induced cross-border debt 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Mike Lane, ‘Autumn Statement 2016: The Impact on Multinationals’ (2016) 1333 Tax 
Journal 10.  
2 Ruud A de Mooij and Sjef Ederveen, ‘Corporate Tax Elasticities: A Reader’s Guide to Empirical 
Findings’ (2008) 24(4) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 680, 696. 
3 Ann Kayis-Kumar, ‘International Tax Planning by Multinationals: Simulating a Tax-Minimising 
Intercompany Response to the OECD’s Recommendation on BEPS Action 4’ (2016) 31(2) Australian 
Tax Forum 363; Ann Kayis-Kumar, ‘Taxing Cross-Border Intercompany Transactions: Are Financing 
Activities Fungible?’ (2015) 30(3) Australian Tax Forum 627. 
4 Harry Grubert and Rosanne Altshuler, ‘Corporate Taxes in the World Economy: Reforming the 
Taxation of Cross-Border Income’ in John Diamond and George Zodrow (eds), Fundamental Tax 
Reform: Issues, Choices, and Implications (MIT Press, 2008) 319, 319-321. 
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bias, which presents opportunities for tax base erosion.5 The tax-induced cross-border 
debt bias incentivises behavioural responses to take advantage of the international 
classification differences between debt and equity, 6  and distorts MNEs’ corporate 
financing decisions.  
2. AGGRESSIVE TAX PLANNING AND THE NEUTRAL TAX TREATMENT OF INCOMES 
A central thread in the literature concerning MNEs’ aggressive tax planning behaviour 
is that the opportunities for these behaviours are created by governments and policy-
makers themselves through the design of tax rules.7 This article assumes that where a 
tax-minimising MNE has the opportunity to benefit from tax planning given the design 
of tax rules (including transfer pricing, thin capitalisation and debt/equity rules), it will 
adjust its behaviour accordingly. This could involve, for example, maximising overall 
deductions in higher-tax jurisdictions to minimise the group-wide tax liability and, in 
turn, the MNE’s overall net profit after tax. This highlights that there is an urgent 
imperative for tax rules impacting cross-border intercompany transactions to be 
designed such that efficiency and integrity outcomes are both prioritised and attained. 
Accordingly, section 2.1 below highlights the policy challenge presented by tax-
minimising behaviours by MNEs and how international tax competition may have the 
unintended consequence of encouraging aggressive tax planning. This is followed by 
an analysis in section 2.2 of the challenge presented by the existence of economic 
inefficiencies – or tax-induced distortions – in the tax treatment of cross-border 
intercompany activities, which of themselves give rise to tax planning opportunities for 
MNEs. Finally, section 2.3 observes that, given the trade-off between international 
competitiveness and tax revenue base protection, it is arguably more efficient – and, in 
turn, more effective – to instead align the tax treatment of cross-border intercompany 
transactions to eliminate the incentive for tax planning behaviours.  
2.1 Profit shifting: aggressive tax planning and international tax competition 
Despite criticisms of aggressive tax planning behaviour by MNEs, the philosophical 
framework of free market capitalism appears to justify this behaviour. 8  This is 
exemplified in the ‘efficiency’ argument, which is oft-cited by MNEs as a justification 
for utilising tax havens on the basis that tax-minimising behaviour can encourage 
greater investment by MNEs. While the economic literature espouses that the profit 
motive ensures that resources are being allocated efficiently, this reasoning hinges on 
the simplifying theoretical assumptions that firms operate in free and competitive 
markets. Yet, these underlying theoretical assumptions do not exist in the current global 
financial system. Only the largest MNEs are best positioned to exploit differences in 
                                                          
5 Ann Kayis-Kumar, ‘Thin Capitalisation Rules: A Second-Best Solution to the Cross-Border Debt Bias?’ 
(2015) 30(2) Australian Tax Forum 299; see also Dean Hanlon, ‘Thin Capitalisation Legislation and the 
Australia/United States Double Tax Convention: Can They Work Together?’ (2000) 3(1) Journal of 
Australian Taxation 4. 
6 Mihir A Desai, Testimony before the US Senate Committee on Finance and the US House Committee 
on Ways and Means (13 July 2011) 4, available at: 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DesaiTestimonyFinal.pdf. 
7 Philipp Genschel and Peter Schwarz, ‘Tax Competition: A Literature Review’ (2011) 9(2) Socio-
Economic Review 339, 364. 
8 The profit motive provides the justification for internalising benefits while externalising costs, which 
includes the minimisation of taxation. 
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jurisdictions’ tax systems to minimise their tax liability. This process of tax arbitrage 
does not improve productivity nor does it constitute ‘true’ innovation.9  
Using intercompany transactions, MNEs can shift intercompany expenses to, and 
intercompany income from, source countries to minimise tax payable with relative 
ease.10 De Mooij and Ederveen11 note the empirical evidence on profit shifting yielding 
the largest corporate tax base elasticities. However, the scale of the problem is 
considered to be even more significant with academics including Seto positing that ‘… 
an unknown but presumably significant number of companies use aggressive 
intercompany pricing to reduce their overall tax liabilities and get away with doing so’.12 
Given the significance afforded to the design of rules countering aggressive tax planning 
behaviour by MNEs, it is necessary to consider the impacts of changing these rules, as 
detailed in the empirical literature. Keen has observed that, even though both 
multilateral cooperation and unilateral anti-avoidance rules may reduce MNEs’ 
propensity to engage in profit shifting, this will likely also increase competitive pressure 
on foreign direct investments. So, if MNEs in high-tax jurisdictions are rendered unable 
to engage in proﬁt shifting there may be a greater incidence of relocating production to 
other jurisdictions.13 This is tested through the simulation analysis conducted in section 
4 below. 
2.2 Base erosion: tax neutrality theories and cross-border intercompany transactions 
A central premise of this article is that wherever possible tax-induced reductions in 
economic efficiency ought to be minimised. This is in line with the tax neutrality 
principle, which states that tax systems should strive to be neutral such that decisions 
are made on their economic merits, rather than for tax reasons. This is particularly 
problematic because economic inefficiencies – or tax-induced distortions – in the tax 
treatment of cross-border intercompany activities give rise to tax planning opportunities 
for MNEs. As such, there is an urgent imperative for a tax treatment of cross-border 
intercompany transactions with a strong conceptual basis.  
However, the international tax literature often does not consider the fungibility of 
passive or highly mobile income in the cross-border intercompany context. This 
translates to a lack of funding neutrality in the design and evaluation of cross-border tax 
rules. 
This is arguably at odds with a central goal of economics and the economic analysis of 
law; namely, efficiency optimisation.14 Admittedly, when applied in the tax law context, 
                                                          
9 Michael Porter and Mark Kramer, ‘Creating Shared Value’ (2011) 89(1/2) Harvard Business Review 62.  
10 The OECD has noted “...the relative ease with which MNE groups can allocate capital to lowly taxed 
minimal functional entities (MFEs). This capital can then be invested in assets used within the MNE 
group, creating base eroding payments to these MFEs”: see further OECD, Public Discussion Draft, 
BEPS Actions 8, 9 and 10: Discussion Draft on Revisions to Chapter I of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
(Including Risk, Recharacterisation and Special Measures), 1 December 2014 – 6 February 2015 
(OECD, 2014) 38. For completeness, residence issues are beyond the scope of this article. 
11 De Mooij and Ederveen, above n 2, 683-684. 
12 Theodore P Seto, ‘Four Principles of Optimal Tax System Design’ (Legal Studies Paper No 2008-36, 
Loyola Law School, March 2013) 5-6. 
13 Genschel and Schwarz, above n 7, 364. 
14 See, for example, Alex Raskolnikov, ‘Accepting the Limits of Tax Law and Economics’ (2013) 98(3) 
Cornell Law Review 523, 551; Lena Hiort af Ornäs Leijon, ‘Tax policy, economic efficiency and the 
principle of neutrality from a legal and economic perspective’ (Uppsala Faculty of Law, Working Paper 
2015:2) 17. 
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the unique complexity of the tax optimisation problem renders the task of designing the 
optimal tax system immensely difficult compared to other areas of law such as 
competition policy, corporate law and securities regulation. 15  There are three key 
challenges that give rise to this unique complexity.16 First, taxation inevitably gives rise 
to inefficiencies and some taxpayers’ inefficient responses to taxation cannot be fully 
deterred by legal rules (the ‘undeterrability problem’). Second, it is impossible to fully 
resolve both the undeterrability problem and the ‘redistribution problem’; however, it is 
in theory possible to reach a compromise which balances the benefits of redistribution 
with the inevitable costs of tax-induced distortions. Third, there exists a fundamental 
disconnect between actual tax regimes and the design of optimal tax rules. 
These issues are dramatically amplified in the cross-border setting, where the existing 
system is ‘so far from the optimal income tax baseline that the effort to reference it 
would be decidedly doomed’.17 Raskolnikov notes that there is no optimal rule for 
allocating interest expense by MNEs, nor is there an optimal theory of international 
taxation, corporate tax or capital income taxation. 18  This sentiment is echoed by 
Weisbach, who makes the following two critiques: ‘[s]tandard optimal tax models do 
not even have firms … Neutralities, the standard tool of international tax policy, are not 
helpful’.19 
In this context, this article makes two additional critiques. First, the literature does not 
consider ‘optimised’ behavioural responses by MNEs in the limited context of tax 
minimisation; nor does it anticipate how policy-makers could respond to those 
behavioural responses. Second, the tax neutrality theories that have been introduced as 
criteria for achieving economic efficiency at the international level have limited 
usefulness in the context of designing tax rules targeting base erosion by MNEs.20 
As such, it is meaningful to consider economic efficiency benchmark criteria for 
company taxation and apply those principles to the cross-border setting. Specifically, 
Warren provides a synthesis of neutrality criteria for company taxation, as extracted in  
Fig. 1 below.21 
 
 
                                                          
15 Raskolnikov, above n 14, 524-525. 
16 Ibid 525-527. 
17 Ibid 551. 
18 Ibid.  
19 David A Weisbach, ‘The Use of Neutralities in International Tax Policy’ (University of Chicago 
Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No 697, 18 August 2014) 14-19. 
20 Grubert and Altshuler, above n 4, 331-333; see further Michael J Graetz, ‘Taxing International Income: 
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies’ (2001) 54(3) Tax Law Review 
261, 280-282, who observes that increasing worldwide welfare does not necessarily increase national 
welfare in the case of international tax policy, thereby supporting national welfare, rather than worldwide 
efficiency, as a policy goal; see also Daniel Shaviro, ‘Why Worldwide Welfare as a Normative Standard 
in US Tax Policy?’ (2007) 60(3) Tax Law Review 155, 164-165, who contends that, even if worldwide 
welfare improves national welfare by encouraging cooperative behaviour, unobserved defections should 
improve national welfare. 
21 Neil Warren, ‘Modelling the Economic Outcomes from TVM: Is It Practical and Meaningful?’ in Yuri 
Grbich and Neil Warren (eds), Tax Value Method Consultative Conference, 23-24 July 2001 (Australian 
Tax Research Foundation, 2001), 197-215. 
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Fig. 1: Economic Efficiency Benchmark Criteria 
Economic efficiency 
Criteria Description 
1 Funding neutrality Does not distort the decision on how to fund a 
business (eg debt vs equity) 
2 Risk neutrality Permits risk offset and adjustment 
3 Business structure 
neutrality 
Incorporated and unincorporated companies treated 
similarly 
4 Net income neutrality Neutral in its treatment of different income and 
expenditure sources and asset and liability types 
5 Payout neutrality Neutral between dividends and retentions; and 
neutral in its impact on financial innovation 
(bifurcation vs aggregation)  
6 Taxpayer neutrality Incentives to different groups should result in the 
same outcome for individuals, whatever structure is 
invested in 
7 Capital import/export 
neutrality 
Benefit to resident and offshore investors should be 
similar  
8 Institutional neutrality No prejudice or favour by government to sectors or 
groups (and if so, any market intervention should be 
efficiently targeted, transparent and costed) 
Source: Warren (2001) 
Cross-referencing Warren’s conceptual framework with Raskolnikov’s earlier critique, 
one key aspect that remains missing from the international neutrality debate is that of 
‘funding neutrality’ (listed as criterion 1 in the above  
Fig. 1).22  
In addition to the challenges presented by the complexity of cross-border intercompany 
transactions, these funding options are often economically equivalent (or ‘fungible’) but 
are subject to disparate tax treatments. For example, the cost of debt financing is 
deductible whereas the cost of equity financing is not deductible. This is particularly 
problematic because such non-neutral tax treatments present opportunities for base 
erosion. However, fundamental reforms that aim to equalise the tax treatment across 
debt and equity financing do exist; for example, the Allowance for Corporate Equity 
                                                          
22 Funding neutrality is arguably a subset of ‘capital ownership neutrality’, which has a broad focus on 
‘… the welfare impact of the importance of ownership to productivity in the design of international tax 
systems. This emphasis on ownership effects is consistent with the modern theory of foreign direct 
investment, which is based on a transaction-cost approach under which the market advantages of 
multinational firms arise from the benefits of joint ownership of assets across locations’: James R Hines, 
Jr, ‘Reconsidering the Taxation of Foreign Income’ (2009) 62(2) Tax Law Review 269, 279. 
291 
 
 
(ACE) as introduced in Belgium and Italy, which is the focus of the legal analysis23 in 
section 3 and the modelling in section Error! Reference source not found.. 
2.3 Implementing corporate tax cuts at the expense of funding neutrality: the trade-off 
between international competitiveness and base protection 
Governments and policy-makers are increasingly faced with the trade-off of increased 
international competitiveness to encourage investment from MNEs with the need to 
protect their tax revenue bases. Tax competition is often considered a force that drives 
down corporate income taxes across countries in a ‘race to the bottom’.24 This is a 
product of reactionary policies and the outcome of a reduced revenue take is reduced 
scope for fiscal stimulus due to tightened budget constraints.  
The central argument of this article is that tax-induced behavioural distortions (or 
inefficiencies) create profound problems for governments and policy-makers25 and so 
should not be overlooked when enacting tax reforms such as corporate tax cuts.  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is currently 
considering best practice approaches to designing rules to prevent base erosion and 
profit shifting (BEPS) by MNEs. However, the OECD makes a distinction between 
combating BEPS and reducing distortions between the tax treatment of various methods 
of financing.26  
Yet, it is the decision of the revenue authorities to create distortions which actually 
results in these tax base erosion opportunities.27 Rather than merely addressing the 
behavioural symptoms of these distortions, such as debt shifting via excessive interest 
deductions,28 it is arguably more effective to instead align the tax treatment of cross-
border intercompany transactions to eliminate the tax incentive for said tax planning 
behaviour. Accordingly, the behaviourally distortive effects of tax rules should be of 
primary concern regardless of one’s normative perspective and policy-makers 
concerned about tax planning need to consider the efficiency of the lines they draw. For 
example, while reducing the headline CIT rate may in turn reduce the magnitude of 
allowable debt deductions, eliminating the debt distortion requires more than reductions 
to corporate tax rates.  
                                                          
23 The rationale grounding this analysis is that tax policy developments can be better understood when 
legal analysis is synthesised with economic and political science analysis, thereby providing a more 
nuanced understanding of the underlying purpose, scope and timing of reforms. 
24 Marta Božina Beroš and Marin Beroš, ‘Fairness through Regulation? Reflections on a Cosmopolitan 
Approach to Global Finance’ (2013) 7(1) The Journal of Philosophical Economics 2; Genschel and 
Schwarz, above n 7. 
25 Distortive effects are not merely inefficient; they also affect fairness and administrability: Seto, above n 
12, 3. 
26 It is clear that both the OECD’s BEPS project and the thin capitalisation rules’ raisons d’être are 
primarily concerned with protecting national tax revenue bases. ‘In  discussing  fixed  ratio  rules  it  is  
important  to  note  that  in  some  cases  these  tests  were  also introduced to play a wider tax policy role 
rather than with a focus on combating base erosion and profit shifting. For  example,  a  number  of  
countries  introduced  such  rules  specifically  to  reduce  existing distortions between the tax treatment 
of debt and equity’: OECD, BEPS Action 4: Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments: Public 
Discussion Draft, 18 December 2014-6 February 2015 (OECD, 2014) 47. 
27 Hanlon, above n 5. 
28 Previous work by the author conceptualises the cross-border debt bias as the ‘disease’ and the 
behavioural response of MNEs of engaging in debt shifting or thin capitalisation as merely the 
‘symptom’: Kayis-Kumar, ‘Thin Capitalisation Rules’, above n 5. 
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Indeed, an ACE such as that introduced in Belgium and Italy presents a more robust 
approach to eliminating the debt distortion. These reforms are examined in turn in 
section 3 below. 
3. CASE STUDIES OF ACE-VARIANTS: TO IMPLEMENT CORPORATE TAX CUTS OR 
INTRODUCE AN ACE-VARIANT? 
As highlighted in the previous section, there is a marked tension commonly experienced 
by policy-makers between either lowering the CIT rate (coupled with base broadening 
measures) or implementing an economic rent tax such as the ACE (which is often 
associated with a reduction in tax revenue).29 Further, leading commentators observe 
that, where a jurisdiction has repealed its ACE-variant, this was not brought about by 
any fundamental problem with the theoretical ACE,30 nor any technical flaw in the ACE 
system. 31  Rather, the abolition of these ACE-variants was simply in line with the 
dominant trend of reducing headline corporate income tax rates in the context of ‘tax-
rate cut-cum-base broadening’.32 
There has generally been bipartisan support for a target of lowering CIT rates in the face 
of increasing international tax competition, largely prompted by the forces of 
globalisation as countries pursue highly mobile capital investments made by large 
MNEs.33 
However, the theory of capital income taxation in a small open economy, which 
concludes that the tax incidence for small open economies is shifted entirely to the 
domestic factors of production such as labour and land, assumes perfect capital 
mobility.34   
It remains unclear who ultimately bears the burden of corporate taxes, with Menezes 
observing that:35 
The argument for a reduction in the corporate tax rate was predicated in part in 
the simple theory of tax incidence expounded above. There are, however, 
several reasons why labour might not bear most of the burden of corporate taxes. 
Indeed, the issue of who effectively bears the burden of corporate income tax 
is yet to be resolved.  
                                                          
29 Daniel Shaviro, ‘Should Corporate Tax Reform Efforts Emphasize an “Allowance for Corporate 
Equity” (ACE)?’, 3; available at: http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ECM_PRO_068214.pdf. 
30 Alexander D Klemm, ‘Allowances for Corporate Equity in Practice’ (IMF Working Paper WP/06/259, 
November 2006). 
31 Michael Keen and John King, ‘The Croatian Profit Tax: An ACE in Practice’ (2002) 23(3) Fiscal 
Studies 401, 417. 
32 Ibid.  
33 John Diamond, George Zodrow and Robert Carroll, ‘Macroeconomic Effects of Lower Corporate 
Income Tax Rates Recently Enacted Abroad’ (Ernst & Young Report, Prepared for the Reforming 
America’s Taxes Equitably (RATE) Coalition, March 2013) 18. 
34 Theoretically, it is also suboptimal for a small open economy faced with perfect capital mobility to levy 
a source-based tax on the normal return to capital: Peter Birch Sørensen and Shane Matthew Johnson, 
‘Taxing Capital Income: Options for Reform in Australia’ in Melbourne Institute (ed), Australia’s Future 
Tax and Transfer Policy Conference, Proceedings of a Conference (Melbourne Institute of Applied 
Economic and Social Research, 2010) 179, 187. 
35 Flavio M Menezes, ‘The Business Tax Reform Agenda’ (2012) 31(1) Economic Papers 3, 4. 
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While this article does not purport to enter this debate, given the global trend of lowering 
CIT rates it is instructive to briefly earmark the six reasons set out below against said 
reform.36 
First, the home bias persists, capital markets are not perfect37 and a CIT rate reduction 
in the host country only transfers tax revenues to countries that tax their MNEs on their 
worldwide income but allow foreign tax credits for the corporate taxes paid at source, 
thereby failing to change both the effective tax burden and the investment behaviour of 
MNEs.38 
Second, the empirical evidence on the actual corporate tax burden borne by wages 
remains unclear, with the literature strongly questioning the theoretical suggestion that 
the tax incidence for small open economies is shifted entirely to the domestic factors of 
production such as labour and land. Further, reducing the CIT rate does not result in 
immediate flow-on benefits to workers in the form of extra capital, higher productivity 
and wages.39 
Third, since the CIT is levied on both normal returns to capital and rents, a reduction in 
the headline CIT rate will necessarily reduce the tax on economic rents; thereby 
reducing the tax on investment that would occur in any event.40  
Fourth, reducing the CIT rate will disproportionately benefit larger, more profitable 
firms, with no impact on already loss-making firms. 
Fifth, the emerging literature focusing on the real economic effects of CIT rate changes 
shows that while CIT rate increases uniformly reduce employment and income, CIT 
rate reductions are ineffectual in boosting economic activity 41  except when 
implemented during recessions.42 
Sixth, further reductions to the CIT rate will widen the wedge between the highest 
personal income tax bracket and the CIT rate, implying that further reductions in the 
CIT rate should not be made in isolation from changes in personal income tax because 
this presents a further deviation from business structure neutrality.43 
These factors create considerable uncertainty regarding the benefits of CIT reductions.  
Further, it is noteworthy that the CIT system has the highest efﬁciency costs among 
Australia’s federal taxes, with the efﬁciency losses resulting from taxing normal returns 
                                                          
36 Further, it is arguable that simply lowering the headline CIT rate does not constitute tax reform per se. 
37 Kalok Chan, Vicentiu Covrig and Lilian Ng, ‘What Determines the Domestic Bias and Foreign Bias? 
Evidence from Mutual Fund Equity Allocations Worldwide’ (2005) 60(3) Journal of Finance 1495; 
Menezes, above n 35, 4. 
38 So, in order to protect the domestic corporate tax base, many countries implement thin capitalisation 
rules, transfer pricing rules, controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules and additional anti-avoidance tax 
rules: OECD, Tax Policy Reform and Economic Growth, OECD Tax Policy Studies No 20 (OECD 
Publishing, 2010) 54. 
39 Menezes, above n 35, 4, and references cited therein. 
40 Menezes, above n 35, 4. 
41 Alexander Ljungqvist and Michael Smolyansky, ‘To Cut or Not to Cut? On the Impact of Corporate 
Taxes on Employment and Income’ (NBER Working Paper No 20753, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, December 2014) 31-32, and references cited therein. 
42 Ibid 8. 
43 Menezes, above n 35, 5. 
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likely to be above 40 per cent.44 On the other hand, taxing only economic rents results 
in no deadweight loss. However, as observed by Ganghof, ‘[t]he result was not only 
neoliberalism by surprise[ 45 ] but also neoliberalism by default …interactions of 
economic, partisan and institutional factors may lock countries into rather inefficient 
tax structures, at least temporarily’.46  Accordingly, it is imperative to increase the 
efﬁciency of business taxation, where possible. 
In this context, there are many reform proposals addressing the business taxation 
distortion, including the ACE, Cash flow tax, Comprehensive Business Income Tax 
(CBIT), dual income tax (DIT) and Residence-based shareholder tax.47 Specifically, this 
article’s focus is the distortion between debt and equity financing. Of various 
fundamental reform proposals only the ACE has been experimented with in practice, so 
this is the focus of this article.  
The ACE maintains the current deductibility of actual interest payments and adds a 
notional return on equity to be deductible against corporate profits, at the risk-free 
nominal48 interest rate.49 
The ACE has garnered substantial support from leading academics since its theoretical 
inception and is experiencing increased interest from policy-makers internationally.50 
In terms of its historical development, the ACE originated in the 1970s with the basic 
economic idea contained in the report of the Meade Committee,51  which proposed 
alternatives to the UK tax system. This was followed by research published by leading 
commentators Boadway and Bruce,52 and was further elaborated in detail by the IFS 
Capital Taxes Group,53 and Devereux and Freeman.54 
The literature has predominantly focused on economic concepts, despite recognising the 
relevance and importance of law, accountancy and politics.55 Further, the ACE literature 
                                                          
44 Australia’s Future Tax System Review Panel (Dr Ken Henry, chair), Australia’s Future Tax System: 
Report to the Treasurer (December 2009) (Henry Review); Menezes, above n 35, 5. 
45 Susan C Stokes, Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
46 Steffen Ganghof, ‘The Politics of Tax Structure’ (MPIfG Working Paper 06/1, Max Planck Institute for 
the Study of Societies, January 2006) 26-27. 
47 See Peter B Sørensen, ‘Can Capital Income Taxes Survive? And Should They?’ (2007) 53(2) CESifo 
Economic Studies 172, 218, Table 4.  
48 That is, ‘calculated by reference to a normal commercial rate of interest, fixed by the government’: see 
further, Malcolm Gammie, ‘Corporate Tax Harmonization, An “ACE” Proposal: Harmonizing European 
Corporate Taxation through an Allowance for Corporate Equity’ (1991) 31(8) European Taxation 238. 
49 Ruud A de Mooij and Michael P Devereux, ‘An Applied Analysis of ACE and CBIT Reforms in the 
EU’ (2011) 18(1) International Tax and Public Finance 93, 96. 
50 Christian Keuschnigg, ‘The Design of Capital Income Taxation: Reflections on the Mirrlees Review’ 
(2011) 32(3) Fiscal Studies 437; Gammie, above n 48; Michael P Devereux and Peter B Sørensen, ‘The 
Corporate Income Tax: International Trends and Options for Fundamental Reform’ (European 
Commission Economic Paper 264, December 2006). 
51 Institute for Fiscal Studies, The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation: Report of a Committee 
chaired by Professor J E Meade (George Allen & Unwin, 1978).  
52 Robin Boadway and Neil Bruce, ‘A General Proposition on the Design of a Neutral Business Tax’ 
(1984) 24(2) Journal of Public Economics 231. 
53 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Equity for Companies: A Corporation Tax for the 1990s, Fourth report of 
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currently has a corporate tax neutrality focus grounded in the economics paradigm. 
Importantly, ACE-based reforms have great potential from an anti-avoidance law 
perspective, which is especially pertinent for international company tax purposes.56 
Further, simulations by de Mooij and Devereux show that even with the inclusion of tax 
havens, which halve the positive welfare effect of implementing a revenue-neutral ACE 
in high-tax countries, a European ACE still raises welfare. De Mooij and Devereux 
observe that the beneﬁts of a more efﬁcient tax system in terms of both investment and 
ﬁnancial structure significantly outweigh the negative spillovers vis-à-vis proﬁt 
shifting.57 
The original objectives and perceived benefits of the ACE include encouraging 
domestic investment and employment, and achieving tax neutrality by granting tax 
relief for equity financing. In principle, many leading commentators, policy-makers and 
corporations support the ACE. However, implementing and sustaining fundamental 
reform of the corporate income tax system is difficult. Accordingly, it is necessary to 
consider how an ACE eventuates in practice. De Mooij and Devereux observe that the 
Belgian and Italian ACE-variants are the closest to the theoretical ACE.58 As such, these 
two jurisdictions are the focus of this article. 
3.1 Applied literature analysing ACE-variants 
The majority of the English-language ACE literature provides a distinct focus on 
economic modelling rather than engaging in any legal analysis.59 One exception is an 
OECD report providing a descriptive exposition with detailed reference to particular 
amendments and developments, yet there remains a gap in relation to a critical analysis 
geared at suggesting design improvements for similar reforms in the future.60  
A recent contribution in this area has been the comparative analysis of the Belgian and 
Italian ACE-variants by Zangari,61 who presents the case for why the design of the 
Italian ACE-variant allows for a more robust reform than the Belgian NID; namely, due 
to its anti-avoidance framework. However, Zangari provides a comparison between the 
technical aspects of these ACE-variants in practice, rather than in-depth comparative 
legal analysis. Accordingly, there remains scope in the literature to provide a more 
thorough comparative analysis, with an emphasis on legislative drafting and the 
underlying policy intentions for amendments over time.  
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As such, sections 3.2 and 3.3 below analyse the Belgian and Italian ACE-variant 
experiences, with a focus on the political hurdles to implementing and sustaining these 
reforms.  
3.2 Belgium’s ACE-variant 
The Belgian corporate tax system is considered a classical double taxation system, 
modified by an exemption for dividends from qualifying participations held by 
corporate shareholders and a reduced rate for dividends from participations held by 
individual shareholders. 62  Tax practitioners have long considered Belgium an 
interesting jurisdiction for various tax-planning and structuring purposes.63  
Even prior to the introduction of the Notional Interest Deduction (NID),64 dividends 
could be received nearly tax-free, interest paid on loans taken out to acquire shares was 
tax-deductible and capital gains on shares were generally tax-exempt. 65  The NID 
(otherwise known as the ‘Intérêts notionnels et déduction fiscales pour capital à risque’, 
“Notionele Interestaftrek” or ‘Capital Risk Deduction’) was introduced in 2005 to 
encourage equity financing following two key pressures; first, pressure from the 
European Commission to abandon the Belgian coordination centre regime,66 and second, 
pressure resulting from the expansion of the European Union to countries with lower 
corporate tax rates, such as Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, and Hungary, which emphasised 
the need for Belgium to strengthen its position on the international tax map. 
3.2.1 The Belgian NID: political hurdles to implementation 
When initially introduced in Belgium, leading commentators observed that Belgium’s 
NID reform was very close to the pure version of the ACE,67 with the Parliamentary 
focus appearing to be the tax neutrality property of the NID to overcome the debt-equity 
distortion. 68  The originating explanatory notes 69  detail the political, philosophical, 
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economic and tax policy rationales for implementing the Belgium ACE-variant, and the 
anticipated impact of this reform. 
However, it is also important to recognise that Belgium did not have wide political 
support for the NID reform; indeed, the green and socialist parties opposed the NID, 
which was criticised as being used as ‘a weapon in the election campaign of 2004’.70 
Further, the rationale of highlighting the urgency of the NID in light of the dramatic 
decline in investment in Belgium was criticised in the parliamentary debates as a rushed 
and underhanded political strategy.71 Despite ongoing political debate for over one year, 
which resulted in limitations to the NID, there were only two parliamentary sittings, 
which was criticised as resulting in insufficient debate on the broader reform of 
corporate income tax. 72  This was considered especially problematic by opposition 
parties, who made comparisons to the reform processes in neighbouring countries such 
as the Netherlands.73 
Nonetheless, the parliamentary debates indicate that a large majority of the committee 
subscribed to the philosophy underpinning the reform, with the proposal receiving 
generally positive feedback and unconditional approval by the VLD (the Flemish liberal 
party).74 However, the design parameters had mixed reviews; some parliamentarians 
believing the design was too generous and others considering it inadequate. Finance 
Minister Didier Reynders interpreted this as indicating that the Bill was balanced,75 and 
earmarked an evaluation period to identify areas for improvement.76 At its inception, 
this Bill was touted as a pioneer in tackling tax discrimination between debt and equity 
finance.77 
However, there has been much scepticism about the real motivation for implementing 
this reform, as observed by the National Bank of Belgium:78 
The memorandum put to the Parliament stresses the neutrality property of the 
reform because it enables corporate income tax to overcome the well-known 
debt equity bias. It ends by indicating that the reform also provides an 
alternative for financial companies using the coordination centre regime. Most 
would argue – rightly – that of the two motivations the second was the more 
important and the neutrality properties are more a consequence of the reform 
than its main policy motivation. 
When it was introduced, Finance Minister Didier Reynders and Prime Minister Guy 
Verhofstadt organised roadshows in Asia, the United States, and India to promote the 
NID and explain that the deduction reduced the corporate income tax rate from 33.99 
per cent to about 26 per cent.79 They were accompanied by representatives of some 
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banks and tax advisory firms who explained how the NID could be used for group 
finance companies and treasury centres, for acquisition structures, and for post-
acquisition restructuring.80 Subsequently, many MNEs moved their corporate treasury 
centres to Belgium.81 
It is important to recognise the context to these statements. Even though the official tax 
rate has fallen over 7 per cent in three years, the effective tax rate at the time was over 
21 per cent – higher than the EU average, as noted in the explanatory materials.82 The 
extrinsic materials also indicate that parliamentarians made reference to the Forbes 
suggestion that Belgium had the third highest marginal tax rate in the world; cited as 
support for the proposition that Belgium’s tax rates were high and corporate investment 
and economic stimulus was in need of bolstering (taking into account considerations of 
economics and taxation). Further, the parliamentary debates refer to the high 
unemployment rate as an economic problem with the NID presented as a strategy to 
lowering corporate tax and giving the Belgian economy a new impetus.83  
Budgetary issues generally tend to pose one of the most significant political hurdles to 
implementing fundamental tax reform. Even though the budgetary cost of the NID was 
a significant issue, the government mentioned that it expected a EUR 58 million return 
on the NID reform.84 This was despite the revenue cost of EUR 566 million, which was 
largely accepted by parliament, with budgetary compensation measures and savings 
provisions (including abolishing corporate tax credits and opting-in to the NID at the 
expense of opting-out of ‘investment reserve’ provisions) amounting to EUR 400 
million. The extrinsic materials make reference to the following 10-point benefits of the 
NID, anticipating that the NID would: (i) incentivise equity finance thereby encouraging 
investment; (ii) facilitate employment; (iii) stimulate financing; (iv) reduce bankruptcy 
risk thereby improving credit ratings; (v) anchor investments in Belgium thereby 
reducing relocation risk; (vi) stimulate the establishment of new companies; (vii) ensure 
consistency with EU guidelines thereby providing the necessary legal certainty; (viii) 
facilitate an attractive investment climate; (ix) improve Belgium’s competitiveness,85 
and (x) facilitate private corporations’ investment in construction and property through 
equity finance.86 
The parliamentary debates highlight the criticisms in the design of the NID. For example, 
one of the major obstacles to the implementation of the NID was contained in Article 9, 
which barred companies from distributing the portion of their profits that corresponds 
to the NID deduction by way of a dividend unless they retained an amount equal to the 
amount of the NID deduction for a period of at least four years. In the extrinsic materials 
prepared in June 2005, one of the key anti-abuse mechanisms contained in Article 9 was 
reduced to three years following concerns that a period of four years would make equity 
less appealing than debt finance and could undermine the effectiveness of the NID. Even 
though the design was the subject of passionate political debate87 and was ultimately a 
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compromise, the parliament considered that Article 9 should be further relaxed in 
subsequent legislative amendments.88 Nonetheless, this provision was amended even 
before the commencement date of the NID, with Belgian Prime Minister Guy 
Verhofstadt delivering a public announcement on 17 November 2005 that this obstacle 
to the NID would be lifted.89 While this revision arguably aligned the NID more closely 
to its theoretical underpinnings in the ACE, it is largely an administrative issue rather 
than one of tax policy design which encourages the use of equity financing at the risk 
of making the system more vulnerable to abuse from aggressive tax planning. The key 
criticism was that the NID was largely agreed to in principle, but the provisions and 
administrative aspects were unnecessary to the point that it was criticised as largely 
missing its objectives in practice.90 This highlights how translating ACE theory into 
practice through a robust tax reform design is one of its most challenging aspects, as 
anticipated by the wider ACE literature91 and as experienced by jurisdictions in the 
past.92 
Separately, there was political opposition to the limited scope of the NID, which some 
parliamentarians argued ought to be extended to personal income tax.93 This reflects the 
ACE literature, which anticipates that one key challenge in designing and implementing 
ACE reform is that it does not operate as a backstop to the personal income tax system.94 
Even though leading commentators have suggested that tax neutrality cannot be 
achieved unless there is a personal-level ACE,95 the domestic shareholder position is 
less relevant in a small, open economy where the marginal investor is likely to be a 
foreign investor.96  While it is difficult to pinpoint the non-resident investor as the 
marginal investor, it is plausible for a small, open economy like Belgium.97 
3.2.2 The Belgian NID: subsequent amendments and economic, political and administrative issues 
The NID has been continually amended by the Belgian parliament since its introduction 
in 2005, culminating in the continued reduction in the NID rate and the abolition of 
carry-forwards further limiting the scope of the NID. These two legislative changes have 
taken the NID further away from its original legislative purpose and underlying ACE 
principles. First, reducing the tax deduction provided for equity financing risks 
eliminating the neutrality properties of the ACE and simply providing a sweetener for 
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equity financing;98 and second, abolishing carry-forwards exacerbates the asymmetric 
treatment of profits and losses.99 
However, when considering any subsequent legislative amendments to the NID reform, 
a holistic understanding of the political landscape is an imperative starting point. From 
2007, Belgium was confronted by an ongoing political crisis at federal level.100 During 
that time, the outgoing conservative/socialist government continued to handle current 
affairs, and in October 2007, following much political pressure, decided to conduct an 
investigation into alleged abuses by Belgian companies and Belgian banks of the 
NID.101 
A key political issue in practice is that the NID is thought to benefit the larger MNEs 
more so than small and medium enterprises (SMEs). This is because the larger MNEs 
are able to put substantial amounts of equity capital into their treasury arms or internal 
finance companies thereby eroding their corporate tax base.102 This challenges whether 
the NID is genuinely beneficial for the domestic economy or whether it presents a tax 
break for the most profitable MNEs who are able to tax plan and bypass anti-avoidance 
rules and maintain very low effective tax rates. However, leading practitioners and 
economists observe that the NID also benefit SMEs by incentivising business 
capitalisation and thereby protecting businesses during the global financial crisis 
(GFC).103 Further, it is arguable that this is an obvious feature of the NID which is why 
it was such an attractive investment reform to begin with. Some legal practitioners have 
observed that ‘the purpose of introducing the notional interest deduction was just to 
make Belgium fiscally attractive to foreign investors and to offer a credible and 
competitive alternative for the coordination centres whose system was condemned by 
the European authorities’.104   Indeed, it is arguable that since the NID resulted in 
substantial investment by both local and overseas MNEs, it thereby encouraged a larger 
capital base, which ensured that those companies were well-positioned to withstand the 
GFC because of their capital buffers. 
Nonetheless, the pressure from lobby groups and media sentiment that MNEs were 
unfairly advantaged by the NID remains substantial. By way of background, SMEs and 
MNEs currently have an average tax rate of approximately 34 per cent and 5 per cent 
respectively.  This has resulted in industry lobby groups such as Le Syndicat des 
Indépendants & des PME calling for reform to the NID to ‘reconcile the existing blatant 
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discrimination between hundreds of small SMEs that pay 3-4 times more taxes that 
multinational companies’.105  
Political concerns regarding aggressive tax planning led to the broadening of Belgium’s 
thin capitalisation rule, which specifically targets inter-company loans with a 5:1 debt 
to equity ratio limitation. Further, subsequent explanatory notes106 reveal a link between 
the reduced scope of the NID and the increased incidence of thin capitalisation rules in 
Belgium. The relationship between reducing the scope of the ACE-variant and the 
increased implementation of thin capitalisation rules in Belgium suggests an inversely 
proportional relationship between these two reforms which has not been addressed in 
the English-language literature. Future research by the author will explore this aspect in 
further detail. 
This presents arguably the most substantial hurdle to implementing and sustaining ACE-
based reform; it is politically very difficult to quantify (and therefore justify) the benefit 
of the NID and very easy to point to the loss of revenue; for example, in Belgium EUR 
3-4 billion is claimed in NID deductions annually. However, in an increasingly 
globalising economy with capital mobility there is no certainty that regulatory 
tightening will prevent a loss of revenue. Belgium’s thin capitalisation rules are 
relatively lenient. Even so, many MNEs are now moving out of Belgium as a result of 
the overall regulatory tightening including inter alia tightening thin capitalisation rules, 
increasing interest withholding tax rates, tightening anti-abuse rules and levying capital 
gains tax on shares.  
So, even though MNEs were subject to relatively low effective tax rates under the NID 
reform it is conceivable that this at least incentivised businesses to operate from, and 
develop in, Belgium – this influx in inbound investment may have, in turn, had a 
multiplier effect.  
Nonetheless, the most significant political pressure point and media criticism of 
Belgium’s NID is in relation to its cross-border impact; specifically, the tax avoidance 
opportunities that it presents for MNEs. However, policy-makers are unable to deliver 
targeted reform in the cross-border context due to EU anti-discrimination law. This 
exemplifies the impact that politics has on tax policy developments and practice, most 
recently culminating in the European Court of Justice determining on 4 July 2013 that 
the NID rules and in particular the refusal to apply the NID to a foreign permanent 
establishment’s net assets violates the freedom of establishment.107  It goes without 
saying that this resulted in the Council of Ministers resolving to amend the legislative 
provisions within three months of the judgment of the European Court of Justice.  
Over the past few years, there has been increased media pressure and pressure from all 
sides of politics to abolish the NID. This resulted in the NID becoming a ‘hot topic’ at 
the 2014 Federal election.108  
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Media reports indicated that political parties such as the Christian democratic party 
Centre démocrate humaniste (CDH) promised to abolish the NID as part of their 
election campaigns:109 
The gain for public finances would be reinvested without waiting for the new 
term in a decrease of 10 per cent of the corporate tax rate, benefiting all, whether 
SMEs, TPE or independent … This reform that we can carry out without 
delay … deleting a liberal but also socialist mismanagement … Notional 
interest for everybody, right now: SME, SOHO and independent. 
It goes without saying that the tax policy uncertainty from first implementing, then 
modifying, phasing down, and now considering the abolition of the NID erodes business 
confidence. Leading practitioners agree that abolishing the NID will diminish the 
attractiveness of Belgium as a destination for inbound investment:110 
It is therefore true that the notional interest deduction has allowed many 
companies to reduce their taxable result, but that is precisely the goal that is 
pursued, with full knowledge of the facts, by the political parties that were at 
the origin of the construction and of which some criticize the construction 
heavily today … This constant legal uncertainty incites some companies to seek 
calmer climes, sometimes by establishing themselves at just a few miles from 
our borders, this to the detriment of competitiveness, the economy and the 
image of Belgium on the international stage. This is of course regrettable. 
The fate of the Belgian NID remains unclear, with the reform surviving the 2014 Federal 
election despite talks of its abolition. Meanwhile ACE-variants have been the subject of 
other European governments’ reviews of comprehensive corporate taxation reform 
options, with Switzerland characterising their potential ACE-variant also as a ‘notional 
interest deduction’.111 
3.3 Italy’s ACE-variants 
Prior to 1997, the Italian corporate income tax system, which was designed as a full 
imputation system,112 had not been subject to major reforms for nearly three decades. 
However, by 2004, Italy transitioned from an imputation system to a classical system, 
with a participation exemption regime introduced to mitigate double taxation of 
corporate profits.113 Italy’s move away from an imputation system is in line with many 
other EU member countries. 
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Italy provides a unique and interesting case study because it implemented two ACE-
variants under two different corporate-shareholder tax systems. The first was the ACE-
variant operating in Italy from 1998-2001 termed the Dual Income Tax (Italian DIT). 
Although inspired by the Nordic DIT, Italy’s DIT was very different as it only affected 
capital income. This has leading commentators describing it as “the most confusing 
name”.114 Companies were liable to pay the statutory corporate income tax rate on 
above-normal profits; with the normal return on capital subject to a reduced tax rate 
fixed by the government; a nominal return on capital calculated by reference to the 
average interest rate on bonds plus a risk premium.  
The second is the new ACE implemented in 2012, termed the Aiuto alla Crescita 
Economica (Italian ACE). Leading commentators observe that the Italian ACE shares 
the main characteristics of the theoretical ACE.115  The Italian tax system also has 
elements of a Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) due to the local business 
tax, the IRAP, and also because of the limit to the deductibility of interest, in force since 
2008. Accordingly, the Italian corporate income tax system can be characterised as 
combination of a partial ACE and a partial CBIT, thereby mitigating the debt-equity 
distortion from both directions. 
3.3.1 The Italian DIT: political hurdles to implementation 
An understanding of Italy’s political dynamics is imperative in assessing tax policy 
reforms. Originating from a context of taxpayer discontent and widespread tax planning 
and tax evasion, the then centre-left government introduced the Italian DIT as part of its 
‘Visco’ reforms. The relevant extrinsic materials detail that the Italian DIT was 
introduced to encourage greater neutrality in corporate financing decisions and facilitate 
competitiveness by making Italy an attractive investment destination.116 
3.3.2 The Italian DIT: subsequent amendments and economic, political and administrative issues 
Revenue neutrality concerns resulted in two key restrictions being placed on the original 
DIT which reduced its initial effectiveness. 117  First, the opportunity cost of equity 
finance was not deductible from taxable income, rather it was taxed at a reduced rate; 
and second, only post-reform equity is considered in the Italian DIT deduction 
calculations under an incremental approach (similarly to the Belgian NID). 
While leading academics observed that over time, the second restriction would not be 
problematic in the long term, the short-term political repercussions were significant. 
The Italian DIT was criticised as largely benefiting large and profitable firms, who were 
more likely to issue new equity, while companies in the South and SMEs were less 
                                                          
hold the participation in a business capacity. Individual shareholders not holding the participation in a 
business capacity are also entitled to the 60% exemption if they own more than 2% of the voting power or 
5% of the capital in listed companies, or more than 20% of the voting power or 25% of the capital in 
other companies (substantial participation). Otherwise, dividends derived by individuals are subject to a 
final withholding tax at a rate of 12.5%’; see further, A Uricchio, ‘Italian Individual Taxation’ (Lecture, 
University of Bari, 2014) 18; available at: https://nanopdf.com/download/italian-individual-taxation_pdf. 
114 Klemm, above n 30, 7. 
115 Antonella Caiumi, Lorenzo Di Biagio and Marco Rinaldi, ‘Corporation Tax in Italy: Evidence from 
Tax Return Data’ (2013), available at: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-
bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=IIPF69&paper_id=460. 
116 Luigi Bernardi, ‘Some Issues on the Italian Tax Reforms and the European Tax Environment: 
Introductory Remarks’ (Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica, Working Paper No 457, September 2005). 
117 Staderini, above n 59. 
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likely to issue equity, despite their higher cost of debt.118 This runs contrary to ACE 
theory, which anticipates that the ACE would increase the tax burdens on the most 
profitable firms and encourage innovation by SMEs by lowering the tax burden on 
marginal projects.  
One of the key legislative amendments that aligned the Italian DIT more closely to the 
original ACE was the recognition by parliament that both personal and corporate 
income tax may need to be reformed in tandem to prevent inefficiencies in the type of 
organisational form. This culminated in the reorganisation of the personal income tax 
in order to facilitate the capitalisation of companies. 
 
In any event, it is arguable that the technical and social teething process suggests that 
the transition to the Italian DIT had not been completed, with the Senate stenographic 
report indicating:119  
We have also further strengthened the tools to support new investments, 
through the extension and improvement of the Visco reforms, and the extension 
and acceleration of the Dual Income Tax … its complexity both from a 
technical point of view and from a social impact, required a long preparation … 
2000, therefore, should reap the benefits of this long preparatory phase. 
The Italian DIT was a restricted version of the standard ACE, subject to ‘an excess of 
changes’ 120  and complicated interactions with other taxes, resulting in leading 
academics observing that this rendered both theoretical and empirical analysis 
difficult.121  
It is noteworthy that this reform package was not fully completed due to the change of 
the government’s coalition following elections in 2001, which resulted in the repeal of 
the Italian DIT in favour of a single-rate corporate tax scheme. Leading commentators 
have observed that, interestingly, the abolition of the Italian DIT resulted in a higher tax 
burden for most companies.122 Further, administrative issues surrounding the continued 
‘reform of the reform’ resulted in a detrimental level of uncertainty which stunted 
growth, with leading commentators highlighting the ‘need for stability and completion 
of reforms for greater coherence and rationality of the system’.123 
3.3.3 The Italian ACE: political hurdles to implementation 
Parliamentary transcripts provide detailed insights into the political spectrum and 
background rationales for why the Italian ACE was implemented in the midst of a 
recession. 124  Specifically, parliamentarians from centrist parties observed in the 
                                                          
118 Alessandro Santoro, ‘Ex-post Evaluation of Tax Reforms: The Case of the Italian Partial Ace’, 2005 
(unpublished paper, University of Milano-Bicocca). 
119 Senate of the Republic of Italy, Senate Public Meeting 702a, Stenographic Report, 3 November 1999, 
5-6; available at: 
http://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/frame.jsp?tipodoc=Resaula&leg=13&id=00005402&part=doc_dc
-allegatob_rs:1-gentit_dcdddl4236e4237-intervento_giaretta&parse=no&stampa=si&toc=no. 
120 P Bosi and M C Guerra, ‘Lezione 1: Scienza delle finanze II – CLEP’ (2006); available at: 
https://slideplayer.it/slide/570656/.  
121 Klemm, above n 30, 6-9. 
122 Oropallo and Parisi, above n 59. 
123 Bosi and Guerra, above n 120. 
124 International Monetary Fund, ‘Italy: 2013 Article IV Consultation’ (IMF Country Report No 13/298, 
September 2013), available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13298.pdf.  
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explanatory materials that ‘today’s speakers clearly witness the change in the political 
phase, which led to the opening of scenarios that seemed unthinkable just a few months 
ago’.125 There is specific reference to the fact that the new reforms such as the Italian 
ACE are ‘owing to the heterogeneity of the coalition forces supporting it … the Decree-
Law is only justified in light of this particular political and institutional framework’.126 
This political solidarity culminating in the legislative reform under pressure of a ‘very 
dangerous’ economic situation appears to have resulted in a renewed confidence in the 
Italian financial markets; ‘the political stability provided by the new government has 
had a positive impact on the financial markets with a reduction in the order of 200 points 
on the yield spread between Italian government bonds and German ones’.127 
The Italian ACE128  was introduced to stimulate the capitalisation of companies by 
reducing tax on income from capital funding risk; reduce the imbalance in the tax 
treatment between companies that are financed with debt and companies that are 
financed with equity, thereby strengthening the capital structure of Italian companies; 
and to encourage, more generally, the growth of the Italian economy.129 
However, the Italian ACE was not implemented without political opposition. 
Parliamentarians from opposition parties such as Il Popolo della Libertà (Christian 
democrat party launched by Silvio Berlusconi) commented that the national and 
international press were talking about the Italian situation in alarmist terms and 
observed that ‘real growth in Italy is likely to be negative for a long time’.130 The Italian 
ACE was also strongly opposed by regionalist minority parties such as Lega Nord 
Piemont, who believed that this reform would further depress growth, especially in their 
electoral areas in the North.131 
As originally drafted, the Italian ACE evokes the Italian DIT in some respects. A 
substantial improvement on the Italian ACE is that, while the Italian DIT incentivised 
capitalisation by applying a reduced rate to the portion of profit identified by the 
notional return on capital, the Italian ACE provides a tax deduction in respect of the 
notional return on new equity. Further, the Italian ACE was introduced with retroactive 
effect, or to also apply for the whole of 2011. This ensured the Italian ACE was more 
closely aligned to the original ACE principles,132 directly and immediately allowing 
                                                          
125 Bulletin of the Legislature, The Referral - Commissions V and VI Finance, Budget and Treasury; 
Examination and Referral, 8 December 2011, 68; available at: 
http://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?act=url&depth=1&hl=en&ie=UTF8&prev=_t&rurl=tr
anslate.google.com.au&sl=auto&tl=en&u=http://documenti.camera.it/leg16/resoconti/commissioni/bollet
tini/html/2011/12/08/0506/comunic.htm&usg=ALkJrhgaCPDv5kkzf9KDiH88kWjR8JErnA#data.201112
08.com0506.bollettino.sede00010.tit00010 (author translation). 
126 Ibid 5.   
127 Ibid 75.  
128 Decree-Law December 6, 2011, n. 201, containing urgent measures for growth, equity and 
consolidation of the public finances; Law 214/2011 (22 December 2011) and Decree by the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance dated 14 March 2012; presented by the Government on 5 December 2011; official 
gazette 19 March 2012. 
129 Cortellazzo & Soatto, ‘Aiuto alla Crescita Economica (ACE): incentivo alla patrimonializzazione delle 
imprese’ (2012) 13(1) C & D Informa, available at: http://www.cortellazzo-
soatto.it/Approfondimenti/TemieContributi/AiutoallaCrescitaEconomicaACEincentivoall.aspx. 
130 Commissions V and VI Finance, Budget and Treasury, above n 125, 63.  
131 Commissions V and VI Finance, Budget and Treasury, above n 125, 75.  
132 See further, IFS Capital Taxes Group (Malcolm Gammie, chair), ‘Equity for Companies: A 
Corporation Tax for the 1990s’ (IFS Commentary No 26, Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, April 
1991). 
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deductions for equity financing and not providing an upper limit to the increases in 
equity financing.133 Importantly, the Italian ACE also applies to corporations, individual 
firms and limited partnerships, the inclusion of which promotes neutrality in 
organisational form.134 
3.3.4 The Italian ACE: subsequent amendments and economic, political and administrative issues 
While the Italian ACE is still in a relatively early stage, commentators praise the reform 
as a comprehensive package consistent with preventing MNEs from under-capitalising 
their Italian operations.135 Indeed, the introduction of the Italian ACE has not led to the 
modification of Italian rules on the deductibility of interest. Currently interest barrier 
rules are in place instead of thin capitalisation rules, whereby the limitation of interest 
deductibility is now based on an operating income test, rather than debt-to-equity ratios. 
An equally promising development was announced in October 2013, with the 
government releasing a list of measures it intends to implement to make Italy more 
attractive for foreign investors and to strengthen business conditions. Most relevant is 
Measure 19, which proposes the introduction of the ‘super ACE’, which targets 
companies intending to go public. Although there is currently little detail surrounding 
this proposal, the government has announced that the ‘approach would be the same used 
in the current ACE, which enhances a company’s cost-effectiveness and “transparency” 
after listing’.136 It will be very interesting to observe whether this reform is implemented 
and, if so, whether in practice it more closely aligns the Italian ACE to the original ACE 
principles. 
Operationally, the new benefit results in a deduction from the total income of an amount 
corresponding to the notional return of new equity. This return, for the first three years 
of application of the rule (2011-2013) is fixed at 3 per cent; however, since 2014 the 
rate which is determined by decree of the Minister of Economy and Finance had 
increased to 4.75 per cent for the period ending 31 December 2016. This took into 
account the average financial returns of public bonds,137 and there was the option of the 
notional return being increased by a further percentage point to more closely align with 
the risk-free nominal return. However, the 10-year Italian government bond yield has 
declined considerably in the past five years. Currently 10-year Italian government bonds 
are returning approximately 2 per cent, down from 6.5 per cent in 2012. While this is 
an improvement on the record low of 1.05 per cent in August 2016, it provides the 
context for the recent amendments to the Italian ACE. Specifically, the recently enacted 
Finance Act 2017138 has implemented two key changes; first, it partially amends the 
legislation to reduce the rate of the notional return to 2.3 per cent for the tax period 
                                                          
133 Cortellazzo & Soatto, above n 129. 
134 See further Paolo Panteghini, Maria Laura Parisi and Francesca Pighetti, ‘Italy’s ACE Tax and Its 
Effect on a Firm’s Leverage’ (Economics Ejournal Discussion Paper No 2012-31, 2 June 2012), available 
at: http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2012-31. 
135 Assonime, ‘La disciplina dell’ACE (aiuto alla crescita economica)’ (Direct Taxation, Circular No 17, 
7 June 2012). 
136 Government of Italy, ‘Destinazione Italia: A Plan to Attract Foreign Direct Investment in Italy’ (19 
September 2013) 18, available at: http://destinazioneitalia.gov.it/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/destinazioneitaliaEnglishVersion.pdf. 
137 Cortellazzo & Soatto, above n 129. 
138 Gazzetta Ufficiale, Bilancio di previsione dello Stato per l'anno finanziario 2017 e bilancio 
pluriennale per il triennio 2017-2019 (Art. 67, L. 11 dicembre 2016, n. 232) 11 December 2016, 
16G00242 (Italy) (Finance Act 2017), available at: 
http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2016/12/21/16G00242/sg. 
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ending on 31 December 2017; and second, it subjects SMEs to the same calculation 
method as that designed for corporations. The former more closely aligns the Italian 
ACE rate to the market’s risk-free nominal return. The latter ensures neutrality of tax 
treatment in the context of various legal forms, consistent with the criteria of business 
structure neutrality. Accordingly, it will be interesting to continue observing the 
developments to the Italian ACE, particularly since the recent reduction in the Italian 
ACE rate has coincided with a corporate tax cut from 27.5 per cent to 24 per cent. 
This relationship between implementing corporate tax cuts while reducing the scope of 
policies that aim to eliminate funding neutrality is the focus of the modelling in the next 
section. Specifically, section Error! Reference source not found. adopts a modelling 
approach to evaluate the extent to which the tax policy goals of efficiency and integrity 
are effectively attained through the implementation of corporate tax cuts or whether an 
ACE-variant better achieves these policy goals. 
4. OPTIMISATION MODELLING: DO HIGH-TAX JURISDICTIONS BENEFIT FROM 
CORPORATE TAX CUTS? 
This section introduces the model used to simulate a tax-minimising multinational 
enterprise’s behavioural responses. It also expands the literature by simulating cross-
border intercompany tax planning strategies in responses to both current and proposed 
tax laws; in particular, the existence (and abolition) of ACE-variants and 
implementation of corporate tax cuts. 
4.1 Developing the Multinational Tax Planning (MTP) model 
In an increasingly globalising economy with capital mobility, a lack of transparency 
makes it very difficult to observe how an MNE structures its internal affairs in a tax-
optimal manner. This gives policy-makers little information on the size and scope of the 
problem, which in turn makes targeting tax-minimisation techniques even more 
challenging.139 Given the importance of tax revenue base protection, this presents a 
particularly pressing issue for capital importing jurisdictions such as Australia. 
However, previous research by the author observes that the challenge presented by this 
‘invisibility’ of cross-border intercompany transactions may be bypassed by 
conceptualising MNEs’ funding decisions as a linear optimisation problem. 140 
Specifically, the Multinational Tax Planning model (MTP model) was introduced by 
the author in previous research and its application to this article is outlined in Annexure 
1. 141  The MTP model utilises linear programming to simulate the cross-border 
intercompany tax planning responses of an MNE to both existing and proposed tax 
regimes. 
                                                          
139 Kevin S Markle and Douglas A Shackelford, ‘Cross-Country Comparisons of the Effects of Leverage, 
Intangible Assets, and Tax Havens on Corporate Income Taxes’ (2012) 65(3) Tax Law Review 415, 417-
432. 
140 Kayis-Kumar, ‘International Tax Planning by Multinationals’, above n 3.  
141 Ibid; see also Ann Kayis-Kumar, ‘What’s BEPS Got to Do with It? Exploring the Effectiveness of 
Thin Capitalisation Rules’ (2016) 14(2) eJournal of Tax Research 359. 
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Even though the literature suggests that international tax planning decisions can be 
approximated as an optimisation problem, 142  the use of mathematical optimisation 
remains largely unexplored in the international tax planning context.  
Yet mathematical optimisation is one of the most powerful and widely-used quantitative 
techniques for making optimal decisions. It is possible to utilise mathematical 
optimisation in the international tax planning context by formulating the tax 
minimisation objective (described as the ‘objective function’, ‘𝑍’), which is determined 
based on the relationship between the ‘decision variables’ (denoted as ‘𝑥1’, etc below) 
and the ‘cost’ to be optimised (whether through minimisation or maximisation, where 
𝑐1, 𝑐2, … 𝑐𝑛 are constants).  
This can be expressed as follows:143 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒 (𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒):  𝑍 =  𝑐1𝑥1 +  𝑐2𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝑐𝑛𝑥𝑛  
Once the objective function has been formulated, the ‘constraints’ – which set out the 
limitations – need to be determined. Applied in the context of observing how an MNE 
may structure its internal affairs in a tax-minimising manner, the linear programming 
problem expresses the ‘objective function’ as minimising the total tax payable for the 
MNE. The ‘decision variables’ represents the profit in each jurisdiction in which the 
MNE has a subsidiary and the ‘constants’ are those respective jurisdictions’ corporate 
income tax rates.  
Further, given that the focus of this article is on ‘pure’ profit shifting by a tax-
minimising MNE through intercompany financing, the ‘constraints’ consist of, first, the 
flows from intercompany transactions that can increase or decrease the profit figures for 
each jurisdiction (the ‘primary constraints’), and second, the tax laws applicable to the 
MNE, which can be fine-tuned to particular jurisdictions’ specific tax rules (the 
‘secondary constraints’). 
Previous work by the author has focused on modelling the tax-minimising behavioural 
responses of MNEs to changes in interest limitation rules; specifically, thin 
capitalisation rules and the OECD’s recommendation for a fixed ratio rule. This article 
builds on this previous work by simulating a tax-minimising MNE’s behavioural 
response to introducing an ACE and/or reducing corporate income tax rates, and 
compares the respective integrity outcomes of both reforms. 
4.2 Comparing the impact of corporate tax cuts coupled with reducing the scope of ACE-
variants in Belgium and Italy 
In an increasingly globalising and internationally competitive business environment, 
governments are under considerable pressure to lower their headline CIT rates. Belgium 
and Italy are no exception and there has been much political pressure to lower their CIT 
                                                          
142 Jaroslav Brada and Tomáš Buus, ‘Detection of Possible Tax-Evasive Transfer Pricing in Multinational 
Enterprises’ (2009) 4(2) European Financial and Accounting Journal 65; see also M A Vasarhelyi and D 
Moon, ‘Optimizing Tax Allocation among Countries in the Multinational Entity: A Tale of Many 
Contingencies’ (Presentation delivered at the TTN Taxation Seminar New York 2011, Morgan Lewis 
Bockius LLP, New York, 16 May 2011) 6. 
143 P Sankara Iyer, Operations Research (Tata McGraw-Hill, 2008) 3. 
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headline rates.144 The justification is that Belgium and Italy will be able to collect more 
tax revenue by being more regionally and internationally competitive. However, it is 
important to concede that the economic rent portion of funds may escape tax.  
This model’s ability to isolate and observe the behaviour of pure profits facilitates an 
objective assessment of whether, ceteris paribus, a reduced CIT headline rate in 
Belgium or Italy can benefit the taxing jurisdiction, using the change in global Total 
Tax Payable (TTP) as proxy for this measure. The proxy for MNE tax-aggressiveness 
is when the Net Profit Before Tax (NPBT) booked in the taxing jurisdiction (either 
Belgium or Italy) is between 0–20 out of a total of 100 (where 100 is the least tax-
aggressive).  
For completeness, it is necessary to acknowledge that modelling generally involves a 
trade-off between realism in scope and simplicity to facilitate meaningful analysis. So, 
the results extracted below may not necessarily reflect the only behavioural responses 
suited to each variation. Rather, these figures simply reflect optimised TTP results 
which are based on simplified assumptions to present an abstraction of reality. This does 
not make the observations any less meaningful, since the purpose of model building is 
to learn about relations between variables. 
In relation to the Belgian subsidiary, even if the ACE-variant is abolished the TTP falls 
only marginally. Upon the implementation of CIT rate cuts the Effective Tax Rate (ETR) 
in the taxing jurisdiction falls only marginally for the most tax-aggressive MNEs to a 
flat 24.7 per cent. 
On the other hand, for the Italian subsidiary even upon abolition of the ACE-variant the 
tax revenue base is protected by the existence of the Italian fixed ratio rule. In relation 
to CIT rate cuts, the TTP remains at an ETR of 27.8 per cent for the majority of 
increments of tax-aggressiveness until a reduction in the Italian CIT rate to 25.1 per cent. 
From that point onwards there is no longer an additional incentive for profit shifting 
behaviour and TTP falls to a flat ETR of 25.1 per cent for all levels of tax-aggression, 
as shown in the below Table 1. 
However, an unintended consequence is that for the relatively less tax-aggressive MNEs 
a reduction in the CIT rate in place of an ACE-variant results in significantly lower TTP, 
as illustrated in the below Table 1. In other words, if Belgium and Italy were to abolish 
their ACE-variants and instead synchronise their CIT rate cuts with the US then a 
reduction in their CIT rates to below 24.7 per cent and 25.1 per cent respectively would 
simply forfeit tax revenue from economic rents. 
Specifically, where these variations are modelled with NPBT increments between 0–
100, the ETR ranges between 25.2–32.3 per cent and 27.8–29.5 per cent for Belgium 
and Italy respectively, thereby simply enabling relatively less tax-aggressive MNEs to 
further reduce their TTP. This is shown in Table 1 below.  
                                                          
144 Belgium’s headline corporate income tax rate was reduced from 33.99 per cent to 29.58 per cent on 29 
December 2017: Loi portant réforme de l'impôt des sociétés  (Belgium) [Corporate Income Tax Reform 
Act of 29 December 2017]. Similarly, in Italy, the 2017 Budget approved on 15 October 2016 a reduction 
to the headline rate from 27.5 per cent to 24 per cent: J Politi, ‘Italy’s Renzi unveils spending plans in 
2017 budget’ Financial Times (16 October 2016); available at: https://www.ft.com/content/473a99b0-
9336-11e6-a80e-bcd69f323a8b. 
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Table 1: Results of Modelling a Headline CIT Rate Cut on the Belgian and Italian 
Subsidiaries’ ETRs 
NPBT 
Model 1 
Belgian 
NID 
Model 2 
Belgian 
regime 
without 
NID 
Model 3 
Belgian 
CIT rate 
cut to 
24.7% 
Model 4 
Italian 
ACE 
Model 5 
Italian 
regime 
without 
ACE 
Model 6 
Italian 
CIT rate 
cut to 
25.1% 
0 25.2% 25.3% 24.7% 27.8% 27.8% 25.1% 
10 25.9% 26.0% 24.7% 27.8% 27.8% 25.1% 
20 26.6% 26.7% 24.7% 27.8% 27.8% 25.1% 
30 27.3% 27.4% 24.7% 27.8% 27.8% 25.1% 
40 27.9% 28.1% 24.7% 27.8% 27.8% 25.1% 
50 28.6% 28.8% 24.7% 27.8% 27.8% 25.1% 
60 29.3% 29.5% 24.7% 27.8% 27.8% 25.1% 
70 30.0% 30.2% 24.7% 28.0% 28.0% 25.1% 
80 30.7% 30.9% 24.7% 28.5% 28.5% 25.1% 
90 31.4% 31.6% 24.7% 29.0% 29.0% 25.1% 
100 32.3% 32.3% 24.7% 29.5% 29.5% 25.1% 
 
 
Further, assuming that immobile economic rents will also be taxed at a reduced rate, the 
findings of this study suggest that a reduction in the CIT rate significantly below 25 per 
cent will result in, at best, no difference in the tax benefit and at worst, a reduced tax 
benefit to the taxing jurisdictions. 
For completeness, it should be noted that this study does not attempt to model 
investment behaviour over time in response to global tax changes. Rather, it observes 
that pure profits do not shift and economic rents are forfeited from a CIT rate reduction 
in place of an ACE-variant under both the Belgian and Italian regimes. Further, these 
results also suggest that a combination of an ACE-variant combined with a mechanism 
similar to a fixed ratio rule may present a more effective tax revenue base protection 
measure. This is the subject of further research by the author. 
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Fig. 2: Results of Modelling a Headline CIT Rate Cut on the Belgian and Italian 
Subsidiaries 
 
 
It goes without saying that international tax competition issues cannot be eliminated. 
However, the findings of this model question whether jurisdictions such as Belgium and 
Italy would benefit from coordinated multilateral reductions to their CIT rates. This 
model assumes that coordination would only occur between higher-tax jurisdictions; 
that is, the Belgian and Italian subsidiaries, and the US. The findings are that while TTP 
behaves in the way illustrated by the above Fig. 2, the most tax-aggressive MNE never 
nominates to place any NPBT into the Belgian and Italian subsidiaries; rather it channels 
its profit shifting into the very lowest taxing jurisdictions available to it, ie, specifically, 
in the context of this model, to Singapore and Hong Kong. This indicates that Belgium 
and Italy would not be the ‘winners’ from a coordinated multilateral corporate tax cut. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This article approaches the extensive literature exploring MNEs’ aggressive tax 
planning behaviour from a novel perspective by exploring the tension commonly 
experienced by policy-makers between lowering the headline CIT rate as opposed to 
implementing tax reforms which aim to reduce economic distortions such as ACE-
variants. In doing so, through a comparative legal analysis of the Belgian and Italian 
ACE-variants in section 3, this article identifies four key recurring trade-offs that 
present political challenges to the implementation of such fundamental reforms: first, 
the trade-off between revenue neutrality and ACE system integrity; second, the trade-
off between implementing an ACE (at the expense of tax revenue) as opposed to 
reducing the headline corporate income tax rate; third, on a domestic level, that 
politically the ACE is perceived to benefit MNEs disproportionately more so than SMEs, 
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and fourth, on an international level, that there is a trade-off between the desire to make 
inbound investment more attractive and the risk of base erosion from aggressive tax 
planning by MNEs. 
Since economic distortions are likely to increase incentives for tax-induced behaviours, 
in particular, aggressive tax planning, there is an urgent imperative for tax rules 
impacting cross-border intercompany transactions to be designed such that efficiency 
and integrity outcomes are both prioritised and attained. Through an optimisation 
modelling approach in section 4, this article demonstrates that simply implementing 
corporate tax cuts will not necessarily achieve these outcomes. This gives rise to the 
following two observations. First, this article demonstrates that simply implementing 
corporate tax cuts will not achieve efficiency and integrity outcomes. Specifically, 
relatively less tax-aggressive MNEs will likely be indifferent to a unilateral corporate 
tax cut. This is particularly problematic because if Belgium and Italy were to reduce 
their corporate tax rates to the thresholds modelled in this article (namely, below 24.7 
per cent and 25.1 per cent respectively) they would simply be forfeiting tax revenue 
from economic rents without impacting MNEs’ profit shifting behaviours. This is a 
timely finding given Italy’s corporate tax rate was cut in January 2017 to 24 per cent. 
This unintended consequence is contrary to the underlying policy objective of 
implementing corporate tax cuts, namely, to bolster foreign investment. 
Second, the most tax-aggressive MNEs will likely be indifferent to a multilateral 
corporate tax cut by higher taxing jurisdictions. This is because these MNEs never 
nominate to shift any profits into the higher taxing jurisdictions, instead channelling 
profits into the very lowest taxing jurisdictions available. As such, Belgium and Italy 
would not be the ‘winners’ from a coordinated multilateral corporate tax cut. 
Ultimately, it is hoped that this research will present a platform for further discussion 
on the tax treatment of cross-border intercompany transactions, and facilitate the 
development of design improvements to cross-border tax policy and reforms. 
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ANNEXURE 1 
Determining the objective function 
It is possible to represent the optimisation problem formulaically. This entails a two-
step approach; first, defining and applying the objective function; and second, defining 
and applying the constraints.145  
The general optimisation problem is the minimisation of the objective function by 
adjusting the design variables and at the same time satisfying the constraints. Since this 
model is only concerned with the intercompany activities conducted to minimise tax, 
the only relevant constraints relate to these intercompany transactions, rather than 
extending to ‘real’ economic activities. 
In the present analysis, the objective function is the minimisation of total tax payable 
(‘𝑇’) for the corporate group.146 The modelling will occur in two concurrent iterations: 
first, Belgium (‘Co B’) and second, Italy (‘Co I’). The headline corporate income tax 
rates are 33 per cent and 24 per cent, respectively. 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒:  𝑇 =  ∑ 𝑁𝑃𝐵𝑇𝑖,𝑛+1 × 𝑡𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (1) 
Since this model is only concerned with the intercompany activities conducted to 
minimise tax, the only relevant constraints relate to these intercompany transactions, 
rather than extending to ‘real’ economic activities.  
Accordingly, this optimisation problem is subject to four ‘primary constraints’. Each 
constraint relates to one of the four categories of fungible intercompany funding that 
constitute the focus of this article: namely, debt financing, equity financing, licencing 
and finance leasing (‘ 𝐷𝑖𝑗 ’, ‘ 𝐸𝑖𝑗 ’, ‘ 𝐿𝑖𝑗 ’ and ‘ 𝐹𝑖𝑗 ’, respectively).
147  These can be 
characterised as the underlying capital amounts (‘ 𝐶𝑖𝑗 ’). The ‘flow’ (‘ 𝑊𝑖 ’) or 
remuneration derived therefrom constitutes interest, dividends, royalties and finance 
lease payments (‘𝐼𝑖’, ‘𝑉𝑖’, ‘𝑅𝑖’ and ‘𝑃𝑖’, respectively). 
This is formulated as follows for each constraint: 
Wi =  ∑ Cij × rij
C
n
i=1 ,i≠j
 (2) 
In other words, the ‘flow’ or remuneration (‘𝑊𝑖’) is received by company 𝑖, where 𝐶𝑖𝑗 
is the underlying capital provided by company 𝑖 to company 𝑗, at a cost of capital of 𝑟𝑖𝑗
𝐶. 
Given the fungibility between these intercompany funding activities, the rate of return 
                                                          
145 Importantly, the term ‘constraints’ when used in this context is distinct and separate from the ‘positive 
constraint’ of revenue neutrality and the ‘normative constraints’ of satisfying legislative objectives and 
attaining stability. 
146 While this is a reasonable objective for a US-based MNE, if the MNE were Australian-owned then the 
objective function may have instead been the minimisation of foreign taxes; see further, Catherine Ikin 
and Alfred Tran, ‘Corporate Tax Strategy in the Australian Dividend Imputation System’ (2013) 28(3) 
Australian Tax Forum 523. 
147 For completeness, in the context of leases, this model focuses on finance leases only and this iteration 
does not contemplate the impact of depreciation. 
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is uniform. For ease of reference, this cost of capital (‘𝑟’) is set at 10 per cent in the 
baseline iteration. 
As a consequence, this model assumes that an increase in the profitability of the MNE 
does not generate shareholder pressure to increase the rate of return on equity (in the 
form of increased dividends on intercompany equity financing). However, this 
shareholder pressure is more likely to arise in a widely-held company rather than a 
wholly-owned subsidiary that prioritises global tax-minimisation. On the other hand, 
the latter situation applies to the model developed by this study. Nonetheless, the model 
is designed so that ‘𝑟’ can later be adjusted to simulate the impact of tax rules which 
directly influence the particular cost of capital, enabling a more complex analysis of 
MNE behaviour in future iterations. 
For completeness, there are three key qualifications to this characterisation that certain 
types of debt, equity, licencing and leasing are ‘fungible’. First, this analysis is confined 
to ‘pure’ profit shifting, as opposed to applying in the context of real economic flows. 
For example, dealings with relatively immobile assets such as land are beyond the scope 
of this characterisation. Second, fungibility does not apply to all classes of intercompany 
debt, equity, licencing and leasing – only those that are economically equivalent. In this 
context, it is instructive to contrast a financing lease payment with an operating lease 
payment, whereby the former would be reasonably characterised as economically 
equivalent to interest. Third, this model assumes that it will be possible for the MNE to 
switch between methods of financing upon changes to tax laws. However, this may not 
be possible in all cases, particularly where doing so would give rise to potentially 
adverse tax implications and other costs. 
Further, this optimisation problem can be remodelled by layering secondary constraints 
(which can also be conceptualised as limitations or parameters) that reflect the tax laws 
applicable to each reform variation, as detailed below.  
Overlaying the ‘secondary constraints’ 
This section delineates concurrent and/or alternative tax rules which constitute the 
‘secondary constraints’, to simulate the impact of various rules on MNEs’ tax planning 
behaviour.  
These parameters make it possible to address the question of what the most likely 
behavioural responses would be to alternative types and rates of tax being levied on 
otherwise fungible intercompany activities. This enables a more complex analysis to be 
conducted which also highlights the breadth of the problem, which is that the literature 
has thus far been too focused on modification of one parameter at a time. 
These parameters are as follows:148 
 thin capitalisation rules; 
 withholding taxes; and, 
 foreign tax credits. 
                                                          
148 For completeness, parameters such as the transfer pricing rules and the CFC regime are beyond scope. 
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For completeness, parameters such as transfer pricing rules and the CFC regime are 
beyond the scope of this iteration of the model. Instead, subsequent research by the 
author will build in these additional complexities. 
Further, two additional assumptions are made by this study. First, this model assumes 
that MNEs can relocate almost instantly and free of transaction cost. This assumption is 
used for simplicity and is in line with the approach adopted in the OECD’s BEPS 
project.149 Second, as with the OECD’s BEPS project,150 industry- or sector-specific 
features are beyond the scope of this iteration of the model. 
Thin capitalisation rules 
Belgium’s regime adopts a 5:1 debt-to-equity ratio under their general thin capitalisation 
rules applicable to intercompany loans. This can be expressed algorithmically as follows: 
𝐷𝑖𝑗 − 1.5 × 𝐸𝑖𝑗  ≤ 0  
With the above algorithm, it is possible to target both or either inbound and outbound 
investment.  
On the other hand, Italy utilises the fixed ratio approach with a benchmark ratio 
currently set at 30 per cent. This can be expressed algorithmically as follows: 
|𝐼𝑖 +  𝑃𝑖|  ≤  (𝐵𝐹𝑅% ×  𝑁𝑃𝐵𝑇𝑖,𝑡+1)  
Despite the complexities arising in the calculation of the EBITDA, this study makes the 
simplifying assumption that NPBT is effectively equivalent to EBITDA. 
Withholding taxes 
Unlike most of the other parameters built into the model, withholding tax rates are 
beyond the unilateral control of governments. Each tax treaty – and, by extension, each 
withholding tax rate within each treaty – is the result of a distinct and separate bilateral 
negotiation process. Since withholding tax rates cannot be unilaterally increased 
(although they can be unilaterally decreased) without renegotiation of the bilateral 
arrangements, this parameter can be conceptualised as a ‘supernational parameter’. 
Specific withholding tax rates apply for each of the types of intercompany flows 
examined in this model.  
Table 2 and Table 3 below indicate the withholding tax rates for each type of 
intercompany funding applicable for each jurisdiction (with notation in the second 
                                                          
149 See further, Jörg Hülshorst, Maximilian Tenberge, Svetlana Kuzmina, Alexander Hoß and Andreas 
Westermaier, ‘Germany - Transfer Pricing Implications of Action 4 under the OECD’s BEPS Initiative’ 
(2016) 23(2) International Transfer Pricing Journal 128, 131. 
150 ‘Moreover, the formula of fixed cap does not match best with every sector and firm. That is why the 
Action 4 report recognizes the need to develop suitable and specific rules that address BEPS risks in 
banking and insurance industries. Although it does make sense to respect the specific features of banking 
and insurance industries, other industries might also claim the special treatments from the BEPS project. 
It is not realistic to design the specific rules for every firm, industry or sector’: Reuven S Avi-Yonah and 
Haiyan Xu, ‘Evaluating BEPS: A Reconsideration of the Benefits Principle and Proposal for UN 
Oversight’ (2016) 6(2) Harvard Business Law Review 185, 217. 
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column representing a flow from country ‘𝑗’ to country ‘𝑖’, given the notation of the 
underlying transfer would be ‘𝑖𝑗’). 
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Table 2: Overview of Withholding Tax Rates in Belgium 
Withholding tax rates 
 Interest Dividends Royalties Lease payments 
Belgium 
𝑈, 𝐵151 0/15%□ 0/5/15%● 0% 0/15% 
𝐵, 𝑈 0/15% 0/5/15%● 0% 0/15% 
𝑆, 𝐵152 5%◊ 0% 3/5%♦ 5% 
𝐵, 𝑆 5% 5/15%● 5% 5% 
Key: ◊ government authorities/ financial institutions are afforded a withholding tax exemption; □ interest on certain 
‘portfolio debt’ obligations are exempt from withholding tax; ♦ withholding tax exemption applies to interest paid in relation 
to either a sale on credit of goods, merchandise or services, or a sale on credit of industrial, commercial or scientific 
equipment; ● higher withholding rates apply if there is a lower level of participation. 
 
Table 3: Overview of Withholding Tax Rates in Italy 
Withholding tax rates 
 Interest Dividends Royalties Lease payments 
Italy 
𝑈, 𝐼153 0/10%◊♦ 5/15%● 0/5/8%154 0/10%◊♦ 
𝐼, 𝑈 0/10%◊♦ 5/15%● 0/5/8%155 0/10%◊♦ 
𝑆, 𝐼156 12.5%◊ 0% 15/20%157 12.5% 
𝐼, 𝑆 0/12.5%◊ 10% 15/20% 0/12.5%◊ 
Key: ◊ government authorities/ financial institutions are afforded a withholding tax exemption; □ interest on certain 
‘portfolio debt’ obligations are exempt from withholding tax; ♦ withholding tax exemption applies to interest paid in relation 
to either a sale on credit of goods, merchandise or services, or a sale on credit of industrial, commercial or scientific 
equipment; ● higher withholding rates apply if there is a lower level of participation. 
 
For completeness, in  
                                                          
151 See Convention between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Kingdom of Belgium for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
respect to Taxes on Income, signed 27 November 2006 (entered into force 28 December 2007). 
152 See Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Singapore and the Government of the 
Kingdom of Belgium for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
respect to Taxes on Income, signed 6 November 2006 (entered into force 27 November 2008). 
153 See Convention between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Italian Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with respect to Taxes on Income and the 
Prevention of Fraud or Fiscal Evasion, signed 25 August 1991 (entered into force 16 December 2009). 
154 Francesco Avella, ‘Italy: Treaty Withholding Rates Table’ (1 February 2016), IBFD Country 
Analyses, Individual Taxation, section 7.4.1.5.  
155 For completeness, the 0 per cent rate applies to royalties for copyrights of literary, artistic or scientific 
works (excluding royalties for computer software, motion pictures, films, tapes or other means of 
reproduction used for radio or television broadcasting). The 5 per cent rate applies to royalties for the use 
of, or the right to use, computer software or industrial, commercial or scientific equipment. In all other 
cases, the 8 per cent rate is imposed on the gross amount of the royalties: ibid.  
156 See Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Singapore and the Government of the 
Italian Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect 
to Taxes on Income, signed 29 January 1977 (entered into force 12 January 1979). 
157 The lower 15 per cent rate applies to copyright royalties: see Avella, above n 154. 
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Table 2 and Table 3 where one form of intercompany funding may be subject to varying 
rates of withholding tax, the rate used by the model is highlighted in bold. 
Further, this iteration of the model does not make a distinction between portfolio and 
non-portfolio dividends.158 These rules are nuanced and jurisdiction specific, whereas 
this iteration of the model aims to provide a general expression of the current tax rules 
influencing cross-border tax planning decisions. Similarly, this study acknowledges that 
various other rules may apply; for example, non-portfolio dividends received by a 
resident company from a foreign-resident country may be exempt or non-assessable 
non-exempt income. However, this level of detail is beyond the scope of this iteration 
of the model. The ultimate issue of repatriation is also not considered, given the short-
term nature of this single-period iteration of the model. For the purposes of the 
optimisation model, the existence of withholding tax gives rise to a potentially increased 
𝑇. This necessitates a modification to the objective function, as follows: 
  
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒:  𝑇 = ⋯ +  (𝐷𝑖𝑗  × 𝑟𝑗𝑖
𝑊𝐻𝑇𝐼 + 𝐸𝑖𝑗  ×  𝑟𝑗𝑖
𝑊𝐻𝑇𝑉 +  𝐿𝑖𝑗  ×  𝑟𝑗𝑖
𝑊𝐻𝑇𝑅  +  𝐹𝑖𝑗  ×
 𝑟𝑗𝑖
𝑊𝐻𝑇𝑃) 
 
where 𝑟𝑖𝑗
𝑊𝐻𝑇 represents the potential marginal increase in 𝑇𝑇𝑃, which is a function of 
the rates of return (𝑟, assumed to be 10 per cent in the baseline iteration for all types of 
funding) multiplied by the respective ‘relative value’ for each decision variable (denoted 
as 𝑊𝐻𝑇, with each ‘relative value’ shown in  
Table 2 and Table 3 above). 
A run-time test indicates that the MNE will funnel all funds through a combination of 
the decision variable with the lowest withholding tax rate and the jurisdiction with the 
lowest corporate income tax rate. This can be further validated by a two-fold analysis: 
first, anecdotal evidence from leading tax practitioners suggests that this reflects MNEs’ 
                                                          
158 An area for further research is to consider the ultimate flow through to the final shareholder in the 
model, which would require distinguishing portfolio and non-portfolio dividends – whereas this model 
assumes that an MNE engages in tax planning in relation to its non-portfolio dividends. As Daurer and 
Krever have noted: 
An important principle of tax design is that taxes should have a minimal impact on business 
decisions and with this in mind, tax treaties commonly distinguish between small passive 
investments in local companies (known as ‘portfolio’ investments, as they are assumed to be 
part of the foreign shareholder’s investment portfolio) and more substantial (non-portfolio) 
direct investments in a local operating company … [T]reaties may set two caps on dividend 
income with a higher rate allowed on dividends paid to portfolio shareholders and a lower rate 
allowed on dividends paid to non-portfolio shareholders. The provisions setting out the dual 
caps for portfolio and non-portfolio investors provide the only instance in which the UN model 
treaty is more favourable to the capital exporting nation than the OECD model treaty. Under 
the OECD model, the capital importing country will be required to use the lower withholding 
tax rate when the investor has a 25 per cent or greater interest in the company paying dividends. 
Under the UN model, the capital importing country must apply the lower rate when dividends 
are paid to investors with only 10 per cent or greater interests in a local company.  
Veronika Daurer and Richard Krever, ‘Choosing between the UN and OECD Tax Policy Models: An 
African Case Study’ (2014) 22(1) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 1, 15.   
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behaviour; second, from the perspective of the MNE as a group, withholding taxes 
increase the cost of capital of the funding type by the amount of the tax rate withheld.159  
This relationship can be expressed as follows: 
𝑟𝑊𝐻𝑇 = 𝑟 (1 +  𝜏) 
where 𝑟𝑊𝐻𝑇 is the cost of capital following the imposition of withholding taxes, 𝑟 is the 
rate of return prior to the imposition of withholding taxes and 𝜏 is the withholding tax 
rate. 
Foreign tax credits 
To avoid double taxation, foreign income may be exempt from tax under the relevant 
jurisdiction’s foreign tax credit (FTC) regime. Each jurisdiction unilaterally controls its 
FTC system, rendering this a parameter.  
It is noteworthy that FTC systems and rates differ markedly between jurisdictions. In 
order to convert the FTC regime into an algorithmic expression, it is instructive to first 
articulate the operation of this system. The FTC is limited to the domestic tax liability 
that would be due on the foreign source income.160 Specifically, a jurisdiction’s FTC is 
the lower of: (A) the amount of tax attributable to the foreign source income; or (B) the 
actual amount of foreign tax paid. 
In other words, if the amount of tax attributable to the foreign source income (A) 
exceeds the actual amount of foreign tax paid (B), then 𝑇 will increase by the difference: 
namely, A – B. If, however, the actual amount of foreign tax paid (B) exceeds the 
amount of tax attributable to the foreign source income (A), then 𝑇  will remain 
unchanged, because there will be no increase to domestic tax liability. 
For the purposes of the optimisation model, FTC can be built into the objective function 
with the addition of the following notation:  
 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒:  𝑇 = ⋯ +  ∑ ∑(𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑘  +  𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑘  + 𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑘  + 𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑘)
𝑘𝑗
𝑖≠𝑗
 (𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑘 × 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝐹𝑇𝐶  −  𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑘
×  𝑟𝑘𝑗𝑖
𝑊𝐻𝑇) 
 
where 𝑖𝑗𝑘 represents the inclusion of all three jurisdictions, 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑘  is the initial rate of 
return (assuming the ‘tax attributable’ is calculated on the gross-up, this is the same as 
the initial rate of return of 10 per cent), 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝐹𝑇𝐶 represents the amount of tax attributable 
to the foreign source income and 𝑟𝑘𝑗𝑖
𝑊𝐻𝑇 represents the actual amount of foreign tax paid. 
                                                          
159 European Commission, ‘The Economic Impact of the Commission Recommendation on Withholding 
Tax Relief Procedures and the FISCO Proposals’ (European Commission Staff Working Document, 24 
June 2009) 44.  
160 ‘Essentially, the foreign tax credit is limited to the US tax liability that would be due on the foreign 
source income’: Review of Business Taxation (John Ralph, chair), An International Perspective: 
Discussion Paper, Examining How Other Countries Approach Business Taxation (December 1998) 107 
(‘International Taxation’).  
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Both Belgium and Italy provide some level of relief from double taxation of foreign 
source income. Belgium’s FTC161 is limited to a lump-sum amount equal to 15/85 of 
the amount of the net foreign source income, with a separate calculation applying to 
interest withholding tax, with it too capped at 15 per cent. On the other hand, Italy’s 
FTC is calculated on a country-by-country basis.162 However, for simplicity, none of 
these nuances are included in the initial iterations of the optimisation model. 
                                                          
161 Called the QFIE system (“quotité forfaitaire d’impôt étrangers”): Patrick A A Vanhaute, Belgium in 
International Tax Planning (IBFD Publications, 2nd ed, 2008) 91-92, 159.  
162 See further, Avella, above n 154. 
